A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How by Carter J. Adam

Author:Carter, J. Adam
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK

Spurious

(13) Smith knows how to perform a triple Axel.

(14) Smith tells Jones how to perform a triple Axel.

So, (15) Jones knows how to perform a triple Axel.

Spurious is parallel to Questionable, but, whereas Tao telling Smith about topology can give Smith some knowledge of topology, Smith telling Jones how to perform a triple Axel does nothing to give Jones practical knowledge, that is non-deontic IK. Jones can, though, come to acquire deontic IK on this basis. When Smith tells Jones how to perform a triple Axel, Jones learns how one ought to perform the triple Axel. Smith’s new deontic IK, however, doesn’t give him the crucial practical knowledge. He needs something more than being told what to do.

The same pattern holds for complex instances of propositional knowledge. Sam knows that all non-trivial zeros of the zeta function have as real part 1/2. Sam tells Jones this. Assuming that Jones understands what is said (he understands the concepts expressed) Jones comes to know this. So the difference in learning is not a result of complexity.

A second line of response highlights the role of understanding and retaining what is communicated in testimony.27 In all of the cases I’ve assumed that the hearer accepts what is communicated by the testifier. But one might respond that in the failures of practical knowledge to transfer the hearer either does not understand what is communicated or does not retain this information. If, for instance, Hannah understands and retains what Bill communicated then, plausibly, Hannah understands how to ride a bike. And if she understands how to ride a bike then she knows how to ride a bike.

Two points undermine this objection. First, corresponding to the distinction between deontic IK (knowing how one ought to φ) and non-deontic IK (knowing how to φ), there is a distinction between deontic understanding-how (understanding how one ought to φ) and non-deontic understanding-how (understanding how to φ). It is plausible that Hannah acquires deontic IK upon understanding and retaining Bill’s testimony about how to ride a bike. That is, Hannah learns from Bill how one ought to ride a bike. Mutatis mutandis, it is plausible that Hannah acquires deontic understanding-how; Hannah understands how one ought to ride a bike. The question is whether Hannah acquires non-deontic understanding-how and this is the same as the question whether she acquires practical knowledge.

Second, given that deontic IK is easily transferred, it is implausible that the failure of non-deontic IK to transfer is attributable to a lack of grasping the content of what is communicated. If the objection is that there are practical concepts that Hannah lacks and so she doesn’t understand what is communicated then the objections faces two problems: first, it incorrectly predicts that Hannah does not acquire deontic IK; and second, it predicts that (†) is true because the crucial concepts involved in non-deontic IK cannot easily be transferred by testimony. Thus, this saves intellectualism only to recreate the old distinction between know-how and know-that at the level of concepts.

A final line of resistance to our argument invokes practical modes of presentation.

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